The Caspian disputes: nationalism and nomadism in early Soviet Central Asia by Thomas, A
1 
 
The Caspian Disputes:  
Nationalism and Nomadism in Early Soviet Central Asia 
 
At the dawn of the Soviet era, nomadic migrations around the Caspian Sea were 
bookended by conflict.i As they reached their northernmost pastures west of the Ural River, 
each year nomads were finding larger Russian settlements where open pasture had been. 
When they headed south, onto the Ustyurt Plateau which sits between the Caspian Sea and 
what was once the Aral Sea, they encountered competition of a different kind. The 
Mangïshlak Peninsula had long been a theatre for hostilities between nomadic tribes, who 
would soon be formally divided into either the Turkmen or Kazakh nations.ii Further still 
across the Ustyurt, the shallow Garabogazköl Lagoon was at the heart of a landscape whose 
resources were contested. 
No single factor explains the conflict along either strip of the Caspian shoreline and in 
both cases strife long predated the coming of the Bolsheviks. Yet, on arrival, Communist 
power set about defining and then trying to resolve the problems that beset its local nomadic 
subjects. The manner in which it attempted to do so - the topic of this article - is a case study 
in the interaction between two phenomena: first, the Soviet state’s treatment of its nomadic 
communities and second, the Soviet state’s treatment of its national minorities. The latter was 
and is often referred to as the National Question. 
The Bolsheviks’ National Question has received much scholarly attention. Studies by 
historians including Francine Hirsch, Terry Martin, Yuri Slezkine and Jeremy Smith analyse, 
in their various ways, the actions of a Communist Party seeking to create national republics 
and semi-autonomous territories in the former Russian Empire and the various methods 
employed to do so.iii This often involved negotiation with regional elites who spoke the 
language of national liberation and, as the Red Army’s supremacy became clear, lobbied for 
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some form of autonomy within an emerging Soviet polity.iv While there are significant 
disagreements among contemporary scholars about the nature and impact of this agenda, 
what is most important for the resolution of conflict along the Caspian shoreline is that it 
entailed a certain way of understanding the people of the region.v More specifically, the 
National Question was the product of an assumption that people could and should be divided 
into different national groups. As will be shown, the typology of nationhood employed by the 
Communist Party squeezed out alternative systems of categorisation, with mixed results. 
If the treatment of national minorities has been examined in some detail, the treatment 
of nomads, an agricultural minority in the former Tsarist Empire, has been investigated less 
extensively. Much analysis has focused on the Kazakh Republic, which contained a large 
number of Central Asian nomads and encompassed much of the territory under discussion in 
this article, and on the Sedentarisation drive.vi Beginning in 1928, militia in the employ of the 
Party began using violence to force nomadic communities in Central Asia to settle.vii The 
demographic impact of this campaign, which coincided with Collectivisation and precipitated 
mass famine, was catastrophic. Estimates vary, but overall Soviet Kazakh fatalities reached 
perhaps 1.5 million between 1928 and 1934, when Sedentarisation was discontinued.viii 
Russian-language analyses of Sedentarisation in Kazakhstan are often written into the 
country’s narrative as a period of profound brutality experienced by the Kazakh people 
comparable to the Holodomor in Ukraine.ix 
As scholarship looks primarily towards the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the years 
preceding this period are used to provide a prelude to the Collectivisation and Sedentarisation 
campaigns. This prelude might portend the oncoming period of mass violence or act as a 
point of contrast.x Yet the early 1920s offer more than just further illumination of the 
Collectivisation era. If that period of brutality represents one contextual framework, an 
alternative contextual framework facilitates an alternative analysis. The treatment of nomads 
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in early Soviet Central Asia may then also yield fresh insight into the Bolsheviks’ 
understanding of non-Russian peoples and Soviet power’s effect on local economic or 
agricultural activities which sat awkwardly alongside the regime’s overall developmental 
aims.xi 
With an understanding of the aforementioned National Question it is possible to 
contextualise the early Soviet state’s treatment of its nomadic population differently and to 
begin to make new sense of it. The National Question engendered two types of boundary, one 
nominally physical, one subtler and more abstract. Both shaped the nomadic experience of 
Soviet power. 
First, the jurisdictions of each new national territory had to be bounded, and so 
geographical boundaries had to be drawn. Of course, borders were not an unheard of 
phenomenon in Central Asia before the Soviet period. The last administration to govern the 
north-eastern Caspian shoreline was the Tsarist Empire and it too was fond of boundary lines. 
But the Tsarist and Soviet approaches to border-making were markedly different, and this 
had further implications for nomadic communities. Tsarist borders were often drawn along 
topographical features for administrative expediency, whereas the Bolsheviks sought to 
reflect the predominant languages and cultures of different areas in spite of the fact that 
‘Diverse peoples lived interspersed; many had at one time been nomadic, and some still 
were.’xii Thus Hirsch states that the delimitation of the region into republics in the 1920s 
‘…changed the political and social terrain of Central Asia.’xiii 
The second way in which the National Question contextualises the earliest treatment of 
nomads is in its system of categorisation. As already stated, the National Question was 
derived from a social typology in which Central Asian peoples could be neatly divided into 
different national groups or cultures. In other words the Bolsheviks drew classificatory 
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boundaries between peoples which they came to treat as discrete nations. Acceptance of these 
boundaries necessitated certain interpretative assumptions for administrators operating 
around the Caspian and elsewhere. The Bolsheviks’ early recognition of the differences 
between, for example, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz rendered obsolete their Tsarist 
predecessors’ Governor-Generalship of Turkestan, which at one point housed them all.xiv As 
new national territories were carved out of old imperial structures, conflict over resources and 
jurisdictions proliferated, and these were understood by administrators as disagreements 
between nationalities.xv  
While this may not preclude a refined understanding of the differences between 
nomadic and sedentary groups, the typology of nationality would prove so compelling, and 
would perhaps require so much intellectual exertion, as to make the nomadic-sedentary 
divide seem less relevant.xvi Furthermore the creation of national borders complicated 
nomadic life in ways which sometimes exacerbated rather than mitigated conflicts such as 
those associated with nomadic communities around the shore of the Caspian Sea. The 
Communist Party’s attempts to resolve these conflicts are hereafter divided into two 
geographical regions, the first to the north beside and beyond the Ural River, the second to 
the south around the Garabogazköl Lagoon. In both cases, the National Question affected the 
state’s approach and effect. 
Beyond the Ural River 
On 3rd October 1921 the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture (Narkomzem RSFSR), 
based in Moscow, turned its attention to two pending territorial disputes between the 
governates of Bukey and Astrakhan.xvii The first dispute concerned 10,677 desiatinas of land 
connected to Lake Baskunchak, a landlocked body of salt water around 160 miles north of 
the Caspian Sea and not far east of the Volga. The second related to the 50,977 desiatinas 
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encompassed by the ‘Regular Nomadic Encampment’ (Ocherednoe Kochev′e).xviii This 
‘encampment’ was in fact a swathe of land once claimed by Kazakhs but increasingly leased 
to Russian farmers. It sat between Lake Baskunchak and the Volga River.xix The Astrakhan 
and Bukey Governates each professed an interest in these two regions, which straddled a 
border between administrative jurisdictions, between national territories, and between 
agricultural practices. 
Both of these pockets of land were located between the Volga River to the west and the 
Ural River to the east, in a region where historical claims of ownership were complicated. In 
the late eighteenth century Kazakhs had been forbidden from crossing the Ural River from 
the east and using nearby pasture because this had led to clashes with nearby Cossacks.xx 
Then in 1801 Tsarist authorities gave a collection of Kazakh families permission to emigrate 
across the Ural River and establish a new khanate named after their leader, Sultan Bukey.xxi 
The subsequent creation of a nominally autonomous Bukey Khanate, sometimes called the 
Inner Juz, was also done with the Tsar’s sanction.xxii 
The fortunes of the khanate fluctuated over time, as did its relations with local 
Russians. First rumours of forced conversion to Orthodox Christianity, then bad winter 
weather had encouraged some members of the Bukey Khanate to again cross the Ural River, 
west to east, and return to their former Juz, only to be repeatedly driven back by Russian 
forces. As it would again later in the early 1920s, the Russian habit of leasing land to nomads 
led to mutual accusations of exploitation and ethnic conflict.xxiii Imperial soldiers eventually 
intervened to prevent an uprising within the khanate.xxiv On the death of Bukey’s successor, 
Khan Jangir, in 1845, the khanate was officially abolished, though the Kazakhs remained.xxv 
Their land came under the jurisdiction of the nearby city of Astrakhan and they became part 
of the Astrakhan Governate, a governate being an administrative sub-division of the Russian 
Empire. New systems of imperial administration were introduced.xxvi In spite of this, 
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importantly, the resident Kazakhs’ agricultural customs persisted and therefore remained 
predominantly nomadic.xxvii 
The pre-Soviet story of the Bukey region, thinly told, provides background for later 
disputes in the early 1920s but also exemplifies an important aspect of the Tsar’s approach to 
border-making in Central Asia. As argued by Alexander Morrison and Svetlana Gorshenina 
the Tsar’s colonial officers had operated on the assumption that there existed topographical 
features which placed geographical limits on the expansion and consolidation of imperial 
power.xxviii The Ural River was first used to divide Cossacks from Kazakhs. Then after 1801 
it was used to divide two groups of nomads, one set more assimilated into the Empire than 
the other. The river, therefore, was an important administrative symbol, used to define the 
terms of St Petersburg’s control. 
Following the Russian Revolution and Civil War the river’s political significance ran 
dry and a dual process had begun. Ostensible political power was not divided between the 
governors of geographically distinct areas, but between national territories. The 
predominance of Kazakhs west of the Ural River was more important than the practicalities 
of the landscape. Thus the inclusion of a Bukey Governate into the new Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic in 1920 recognised and represented the Kazakh population living in the 
former territory of the Bukey Khanate. The administrative centre of the governate was moved 
from the majority-Russian city of Astrakhan to Urda, a small town now in far-western 
Kazakhstan.xxix Simultaneously, of course, Moscow would steadily gain more power over the 
jurisdictions of Orenburg, the fist capital of the Kazakh Republic, and any other national 
capital as time progressed. Nevertheless the national basis for the border beyond the Ural 
River was new and important. 
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Though both the Bukey and Astrakhan Governates were officially within the 
boundaries of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the Bukey 
Governate was part of the Kazakh national republic as well. In contrast, territorial 
membership of the RSFSR alone did not designate a governate as Russian, and so the 
neighbouring Astrakhan Governate had no formally national definition. With its significant 
Russian population, however, Astrakhan might have been described as de facto Russian. 
Thus the disputes to come between Astrakhan and Urda were not only administrative but also 
national in character thanks to each governates’ affiliation, one official and one de facto, with 
a different national identity.xxx These affiliations were magnified by the Bolsheviks’ National 
Question, and would add a new dimension to matters of administrative jurisdiction, 
profoundly political and deeply contentious in comparison to topography. 
By 1921, then, when a dispute over land-use between Bukey and Astrakhan arose, the 
local organs of power lobbying Narkomzem RSFSR had been substantially transformed by 
the Revolution, though the fundamental differences between sedentary and nomadic practices 
in the area had largely survived 1917 and so had the tensions arising from those differences. 
Also in 1921, Narkomzem RSFSR had tried to direct the migratory path of nomads along the 
Ural River itself after receiving complaints from Cossack fishermen.xxxi The Ural’s 
riverbanks had apparently been undergoing a ‘mass occupation’ by nomads whose herds had 
trampled plant fodder and scared fish into deeper waters.xxxii Narkomzem RSFSR’s response 
was to delegate investigation and resolution of this issue to Kazakh governing bodies, which 
prefigures its later dealings with Astrakhan.xxxiii There was an augury, too, in angry remarks 
from Glavryba, the body charged with supervising the Cossack fishing enterprise.  In an 
address to Narkomzem RSFSR, Glavryba blamed the ‘connivance of the local economic 
organs’ for the nomadic invasion of the shore.xxxiv The suggestion appears to have been that 
local Kazakh authorities were looking after Kazakh nomads at the expense of non-Kazakh 
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nationalities. The assumption that the institutions of the KSSR would act in this manner was 
not restricted to Glavyba and would be tested to destruction at the nomads’ expense.   
Regarding the dispute between Astrakhan and Bukey, after a preliminary appraisal and 
a consultation with the Administrative Committee of the All-Union Central Executive 
Committee (VTsIK, also based in Moscow) the presidium of the Federal Committee of 
Narkomzem RSFSR produced a declaration.xxxv Present at the presidium were two 
representatives of the Kazakh Commissariat for Agriculture (Narkomzem KSSR) and one 
member of the Astrakhan Governate Committee (Gubkom).xxxvi The presidium decided that 
both the land near Lake Baskunchak and the Regular Nomadic Camp should be considered 
part of the Kazakh Republic. Further, all those Russians living continuously within either 
area retained their rights to land use, but now on the basis of Kazakh law and under 
governance from Urda. Russians not permanently resident in either area but using land 
therein were offered a choice by the declaration; take up occupancy within the Kazakh 
Republic and live by its rules, or move to the Astrakhan Governate and lose all rights to use 
Kazakh land. Appeals would be heard until 1st March 1922, and all Russian farmsteads newly 
deemed illegal had to be dismantled by 1st March 1923.xxxvii The presidium’s ruling is 
evidence of the decolonising potential of nationalist thinking very early in the 1920s.xxxviii Its 
intended benefit for Kazakhs is clear, but there is also an implied benefit for the 
predominantly nomadic citizens who migrated north of the Caspian Sea. The forced 
emigration of sedentary Russians would leave vacant contested pastureland and other 
resources essential to the lives of local nomads. 
Appeals to Moscow’s decision were made long before March 1922. Astrakhan was 
informed of the commissariat’s decision, and ordered to fulfil the requirements of the 
protocol, on 18th October 1921.xxxix The next day the Astrakhan Gubkom questioned the 
wisdom of those operating in Moscow, and supplemented its case with a report addressed to 
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the Federal Committee of Narkomzem RSFSR.xl The report made the concession, possibly 
tactical, that the fifty thousand desiatinas of the Regular Nomadic Encampment had been de 
jure owned by Kazakhs.xli Ever since the Bukey influx in Tsarist times, however, land had 
been leased back to Russians on a haphazard basis and the Russians had ploughed up more 
and more of the camp. Crops had been sown and food production among the Russians had 
increased, as had their herds of cattle.xlii Besides, it was argued, the Kazakhs did not even use 
the land. It had become Russian by custom.xliii In the letter accompanying the report, 
Astrakhan reminded Narkomzem RSFSR that the Russian population of both the Baskunchak 
tract and the Regular Nomadic Encampment was larger than the local Kazakh population, 
and that further colonization by the Russians had been permitted and regulated by two 
Territorial (Krai) Congresses of Soviets since the revolution.xliv Astrakhan was using its 
status as a largely Russian city to argue that it should govern areas where Russians were a 
majority. Urda, as part of the KSSR, was less appropriate for the task. The nationality of the 
populations in question was not the only relevant factor, however: Astrakhan further implied 
that productive Russian farmsteads were being put under threat by governing bodies in Urda, 
whose sympathies lay more with the rival interests of Kazakh nomads. Astrakhan therefore 
admitted the presence and importance of nomads in the debate, but only in terms of the threat 
they posed to productive farmers. Nomadic interests were the misguided priority of the 
opposition. 
Some of Astrakhan’s account was questionable. Studies conducted in 1920 found a 
population of 239,300 in the Bukey Governate and described no less than 99 percent of this 
number as Kazakh, the remaining 1 percent being Russian. In no other Kazakh-run governate 
were Russians found to be such a minority.xlv These statistics should be treated with a high 
degree of scepticism given the paucity of available sources at the time and the limited 
resources enjoyed by administrators and scholars after the Civil War. Besides, as is clear 
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from the dispute between Urda and Astrakhan itself, the official boundaries of what was 
considered the Bukey Governate would have been ambiguous in 1920 to anyone conducting a 
study. Nevertheless, Narkomzem RSFSR had seen reports on the preponderance of Kazakhs 
in the Bukey Governate by late 1922, and this can only have damaged the credibility of 
claims made by Astrakhan about the number of Russians on the borderlands.xlvi Most 
probably, ambiguity arose from the lack of consensus on what constituted residence and land-
ownership. Because much of the Kazakh population was regularly migrating and its habits 
were poorly understood by local Russians, Astrakhan was able to underestimate the number 
of Kazakhs and the extent of their land use, either through mistake or wilful 
misunderstanding. Other organs were free to exaggerate it.xlvii 
In the absence of consensus, the Kazakh authorities were well prepared for a response 
from the Astrakhan Gubkom. Around the time that Astrakhan made its disquiet known, the 
central government of the Kazakh Republic wrote to the Bukey Governate’s Executive 
Committee.xlviii Central authorities proclaimed their explicit intention to protect the interests 
of the Bukey Governate Committee in Urda, and requested further information from the 
governate so that its various territorial disputes could be resolved with Moscow. The direct 
involvement of republic-level officials again implied that the dispute was national rather than 
administrative or agricultural in character, since a matter of bureaucratic expediency and land 
management may have been more astutely resolved by figures in Astrakhan and Urda, both 
more directly involved than anyone in Orenburg. 
Faced with the involvement of the central Kazakh authorities, Astrakhan’s resistance 
continued after Narkomzem RSFSR’s original deadline for complaints had passed. Twice in 
1923, on 23rd April and 24th August, Narkomzem RSFSR made declarations stating that it 
saw no credible reason to reverse the original decision it had made in October 1921.xlix 
Repeatedly over this two-year period, the authorities in Moscow endorsed the principle that 
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the Bukey Kazakhs should be managed by Kazakh organs of state. Whilst simultaneously 
appealing against Moscow’s ruling, Astrakhan made efforts to demonstrate compliance. In 
1922 the governate’s eleventh Congress of Soviets conceded that chaos had been created by 
the unsystematic settlement of nomadic territory, and that Russians had encroached on 
swathes of land far larger than had originally been intended.l These claims bare some 
resemblance to the rhetoric of many in the Kazakh branch of the Communist Party at this 
time, and may have been a symbolic accommodation of the prevailing anti-colonial paradigm 
which was so closely associated with the National Question in the early 1920s.li 
However, Astrakhan’s conciliatory sentiments belied the hardship experienced by those 
actually living on the borderline between governates because the encroachment and 
unregulated settlement of land by Russians was continuing apace. In April 1923, the year 
after Astrakhan’s rhetorical concessions, Narkomzem RSFSR demanded an explanation from 
the Astrakhan Gubkom for its continuing ‘onslaught’ on the Kazakh Republic.lii Though 
Orenburg was granted control over the former Bukey Khanate, Russians from neighbouring 
Astrakhan were continuing to colonize and settle the land there, perpetuating the serious 
disruption of nomadic migratory habits in the area. Back in Moscow, notable figures such as 
Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev acknowledged the plight of the Bukey Kazakhs and held meetings to 
discuss it with Party colleagues involved in agricultural policy.liii Nomadism was 
complicating the western border of the Kazakh Republic, but not only because nomads came 
and went. It also affected the behaviour of sedentary communities. Counter-intuitively, it was 
sedentary Russians rather than nomadic Kazakhs who were more likely to ignore the border 
and colonise the land of a neighbouring republic, acting on the pretence of their 
administrators in Astrakhan that nomadic land was vacant land. Similar processes appear to 




How was this being allowed to happen? The implication made by the Astrakhan 
Gubkom in 1921 was that government from Urda would favour the nomadic minority in the 
Baskunchak tract and the Regular Nomadic Encampment, placing productive Russian 
farmsteads under threat at a time of extensive food shortages. Ignoring this warning, 
Narkomzem RSFSR had granted Urda control over the disputed areas, specifically declaring 
that Russian farmers would henceforth live by Kazakh laws. The stage did indeed seem set 
for the invasion of cultivated arable farmland by nomadic herds, just as Cossack fisherman 
had had their trade disrupted. Yet a year and a half later the opposite was happening. To an 
extent this might be explained by the relative weakness and inability of the state, at this early 
stage after the Civil War, to halt processes which had been underway before 1917. But a 
further reason is that both sides so assiduously fought this territorial dispute in national terms. 
Orenburg stated its commitment to ‘the defence of the interests of the Bukey’, and therefore 
to the competencies of Urda as a centre of the Kazakh Republic’s power, but not to the 
nomads nearby.lv Narkomzem RSFSR was adjudicating at a time of official sensitivity to the 
dangers of Great Russian chauvinism, and its rejection of Astrakhan’s arguments should be 
understood in this context.lvi Nomadism may have caused the debate in the first place, as it 
complicated land-ownership in the Bukey Governate and made it difficult to draw a clearly 
recognisable border. But the dispute was resolved by bodies speaking for Russians and 
Kazakhs, not farmers and nomads, and the extension of nomadic practice was subsequently 
raised mainly by administrators in Astrakhan scare-mongering about the intentions of those 
in Urda. 
The formal extension of the Kazakh Republic’s borders to encompass nomadic lands in 
the far west might at first seem like an early sign that nomadic life would be respected under 
Communism. In fact it was a sign that Kazakh national, territorial identity was gaining formal 
recognition, replacing the old Tsarist principles of topographical and administrative 
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expediency. This meant Kazakh bodies were likely to govern lands in which Kazakhs 
predominated, irrespective of whether those Kazakhs were nomadic or how well those 
nomads would be treated. Indeed, even as the Kazakh national border was firmly set in place 
to the west of the Ural River, the agricultural borders of sedentary farming thundered 
eastwards. The defence of national jurisdiction was taking priority over the defence of 
nomadism here and elsewhere along the Caspian, such as around the Garabogazköl Lagoon. 
Around the Garabogazköl Lagoon 
In mid-July 1922 a report was produced by the Executive Committee of the 
Krasnovodsk Uezd, an administrative division containing many Turkmen in what was then 
the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.lvii The report declared that since the 
beginning of that year Kazakhs from the bordering Adai Uezd had stolen 350 camels and 
1,000 rams from Turkmen communities. Four Turkmen had been killed by Kazakhs. In 
response, six Kazakh women had been abducted and a number of cattle stolen. Though four 
of the women were subsequently returned, two remained kidnapped, and the Krasnovodsk 
Committee described how the Turkmen were preparing for a counter-attack.lviii 
New Soviet committees were already familiar with such behaviour. Since spring 1921 
local authorities had been encouraging Kazakhs to return livestock to Turkmen tribes in 
exactly the quantities that were stolen since before 1919. Murder, raids and attacks were all 
described and condemned.lix The Adai region was itself notorious. The Adai were originally a 
tribal grouping within the Kazakhs’ Younger Juz which rebelled against Tsarist authorities in 
1870. Violent protests split the Kazakh elites in the area, some of whom sided with the 
Russian administration and were rewarded, whilst others continued to resist tax rises and the 
confiscation of pasturelands and were brutally repressed.lx Briefly part of the Turkestan 
Republic, the Adai Uezd joined the KSSR in October 1920. Though it remained an uezd, it 
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was given the formal, more substantive powers of an oblast, a second type of administrative 
region.lxi It was also enlarged to encompass two nomadic districts of the Krasnovodsk Uezd 
to the south.lxii 
The Krasnovodsk Uezd was then part of the Turkestan Republic but would join the 
Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. Both before and after this point, administrative 
bodies based in Krasnovodsk itself (now Türkmenbaşy) felt able to speak on behalf of local 
communities who would be assimilated into the single Turkmen nation.lxiii In post-Soviet 
historiography the Turkmen tribes are sometimes distinguished from the other titular 
nationalities of Soviet Central Asia by their particular interpretation of Islam.lxiv As with 
Kazakh tribal confederations, however, genealogy and kinship were vitally important to 
Turkmen allegiances.lxv The ‘extraordinary ethnic complexity’ of Central Asia applied as 
much to Turkmen as to Kazakhs, and it would be inappropriate to suggest that the disorder 
along the shores of the Caspian Sea was the product of clashes between just two distinct 
national groups.lxvi This is the suggestion made by many of the Soviet sources, though there 
is evidence that a more nuanced position could be found within the Soviet administration as 
well as outside it. 
Alibi Dzhangil′din was a major figure in Kazakh politics in the early 1920s who visited 
the Adai and Turkmen borderlands in 1922-1923. He reported that the population of the Adai 
Uezd, whom he called adaevtsy, migrated perpetually throughout the year. This migration 
took them annually over the Kazakh-Turkestan border and into land used by Turkmen. 
Though he considered them loyal to Soviet power, Dzhangil′din placed heavy emphasis on 
the primitive life of the adaevtsy, presenting them as helpless in the face of bad weather and a 
hostile natural environment.lxvii Adaevtsy were also used as examples of the most destitute of 
the republic’s population by foremost Party members.lxviii 
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It is itself notable that some reports contain no references to Kazakhs at all, preferring 
instead a derivation of the Adai title.lxix It shows that in January 1923, when Dzhangil′din’s 
report was written, an astute observer understood that the loyalties dividing the people of the 
Ustyurt Plateau were more those of kinship than nationhood. As well as weather and 
environmental conditions, the adaevtsy were also said to be at the mercy of raids from the 
Iomud. The Iomud were another tribal grouping, soon to be incorporated into the Turkmen 
nation.lxx There is clear evidence that, when the Adai Uezd expanded southwards and claimed 
land formerly governed by Krasnovodsk, resident Iomuds showed little appreciation for this 
administrative reorganization. New Adai committees in the area had struggled to prevent 
fellow Adai from attacking the Iomud, but had also called upon the Krasnovodsk authorities 
to resist any temptation to interfere. It had become Kazakh land. Adai authorities instead 
recommended the creation of a governing assembly representing both peoples.lxxi 
The Turkmen-Kazakh border, which sat close to the shore of the Garabogazköl Lagoon, 
was in 1921 taken seriously by Soviet administrators but largely ignored by local nomads. 
The border was both cause and symptom of the Communist Party’s insistence that violence 
between nomads should be understood in national terms. That this was so is immediately 
clear from the measures taken by the state to bring order to the Ustyurt Plateau.  
On 6th April 1921 the Krasnovodsk Uezd-City Executive Committee decided to 
convene a ‘Kazakh-Iomud’ Conference in Krasnovodsk.lxxii It was one of the new Soviet 
state’s first major attempts at resolving inter-tribal conflict in nomadic regions, and it 
accepted the following agenda for the day: 
1) The establishment of borders between Turkmen and Kazakh migrations 
2) The liquidation of the Kazakh-Iomud conflictlxxiii 
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The conference felt unable to resolve the first matter. Kazakhs of the two districts 
which had recently left the jurisdiction of Krasnovodsk and joined the Adai Uezd complained 
that their water sources and pasturage were over the border to the south, and so they had to 
enter Turkestan to survive. Attendees decided to allow the Kazakh and Turkestan 
governments to solve this problem, and as a temporary solution they sought to dissuade 
Kazakhs from migrating too close to areas where conflict with Iomud was more likely. 
Around the Garabogazköl, in particular, Kazakh nomads were advised to migrate along a 
specific route. Turning to the second item on their agenda, conference members demanded an 
immediate cessation of all hostilities.  A second Kazakh-Iomud Conference was scheduled 
for 1st July 1921, which would discuss conflicts in areas which had not dispatched a delegate 
to Krasnovodsk.lxxiv 
Hostilities, it is evident, did not cease for several years. The thought of convening a 
conference to conclude long-lived tribal antipathies is itself interesting. It perhaps speaks of 
the early self-confidence of Soviet administrators who believed that a talking-shop could 
mitigate a fierce battle for the limited resources east of the Caspian. But the occurrence and 
subsequent failure of these staged events are easily connected to other, more specific trends 
in the relationship between Soviet state and Kazakh nomad. 
First, easy assumptions about the inherent disorder of nomadic society must be avoided, 
but abduction and raids were not new phenomena amongst these communities. Kazakh 
concepts such as barymta (cattle-rustling) and qun (blood feud) suggest that nomads saw 
such practices as more a part of everyday life, and less a crisis of lawlessness, than Soviet 
administrators were prepared to accept.lxxv This might be associated with what Edward 
Schatz calls ‘criminalising clans’, the Soviet intrusion into traditional forms of authority in 
Kazakh society.lxxvi In other words, already in 1921 the Soviet state was motivated to sweep 
away some habits of nomadic life.lxxvii 
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Second, the Krasnovodsk conference spoke of a Kazakh-Iomud conflict, but also of a 
Kazakh-Turkmen border. A key source of the former, it was believed, was disrespect for the 
latter, as it was best to keep warring tribes apart. Immediately this necessitated the 
intervention of nation-wide authorities, and focus shot from the fundamentals of nomadic 
existence to the high politics of national jurisdiction. Like the plight of nomads in the Bukey 
Governate, the idiosyncrasies of nomadic life and death on the Ustyurt were again subsumed 
into a nation-based understanding of Central Asia. Even a peace agreement signed on 8th 
August 1921 bore the names of representatives from the Kazakh and the ‘Turkmen-Iomud’ 
people, both quasi-national rather than tribal affiliations, in the fashion of a diplomatic 
accord.lxxviii Similar efforts were made to establish peace between Turkmen and Uzbeks 
around Khiva.lxxix 
Borders negotiated between nations created new problems for migrating nomads, 
whether Kazakh or Turkmen-Iomud. In the 1920s the Mangïshlak was one of the few places 
where nomads continued to migrate perpetually throughout the year, and any new boundary 
separated people from resources which they had long used, but over which no legal 
ownership was agreed.lxxx The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel 
RSFSR) had to try and supervise the expulsion of communities who found themselves on the 
wrong side of the divide.lxxxi Further east along the border between Turkestan and the KSSR, 
it was reported in 1922 that nomads were continuing to travel south to trade, as they had done 
for generations. Typically Kazakhs would exchange their cattle for bread and other farming 
produce. On their return journeys, militia men at the border would find the nomads’ bread 
supplies and accuse them of speculation. The food would be requisitioned (sometimes for the 
border guards’ own consumption), and occasionally nomads were arrested.lxxxii 
The border negotiations between Turkmen and Kazakh territories bore more than a 
passing resemblance to those underway further north between Astrakhan and Urda. Like the 
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Astrakhan Governate Committee, the Krasnovodsk Uezd-City Executive Committee was 
then part of a Soviet polity which did not engender one specific national identity. The 
Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was similar to the RSFSR in that it was 
conceived without a dominant titular nationality. Yet negotiators on both sides defended the 
rights of disparate nomadic tribes using the language of national territorial integrity. If this 
was done to protect those leading a nomadic lifestyle, the resolution of disagreements and the 
imposition of borders did not ease the difficulties experienced by nomads and at times 
exacerbated them. As in the Bukey Governate, nomads on the periphery of Kazakh territory 
were at the epicentre of a power struggle over resources and control, but this would earn them 
no favours from Kazakh authorities with limited understanding of tribal conflicts and limited 
apparent empathy for nomadic communities.lxxxiii Indeed, the national paradigm was even less 
suitable for understanding the processes at work in the Adai tribal lands than it was for 
understanding the colonization of land near Lake Baskunchak. Russian and Kazakh identities 
were at least made clearer through the juxtaposition of their agricultural practices. Around the 
Garabogazköl authorities were still dividing tribes up into Turkmen and Kazakh even as they 
were drawing a line between peoples who disagreed about much but were equally 
inconvenienced by territorial boundaries. 
 A second Kazakh-Iomud conference took place in Krasnovodsk on 25th July 1922, but 
it was hardly constructive. Documentation from the event relates that Turkmen 
representatives complained about the small number of Kazakhs in attendance. They 
speculated that perhaps the Kazakhs simply had no desire to establish peaceful relations. 
There were no Kazakh delegates from any Adai institution present on the day, and it was 
declared that those Kazakhs who had made the journey were from families already migrating 
within Krasnovodsk territory. They were unable to negotiate alone without the authority of 
the Adai Uezd, the government of which had previously given its full support for the meeting 
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of the conference. It was further declared that nothing more could be achieved that day 
without members of the Adai Uezd itself, and again that higher republic-wide authorities 
should involve themselves in the dispute.lxxxiv 
Higher organs of power were indeed in contention over territory at this time, again 
reinforcing the perception that this was a matter of republic-wide and therefore national 
importance. The extension of the Adai Uezd southwards to include the Garabogazköl was 
strongly resisted by the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan Republic. One 
committee member, an N. Iomudskii, claimed to have taken part in an expedition to the 
coastline and to have been well informed on local circumstances there. He suggested that the 
prevalence of wells and pastures around the Garabogazköl would force Turkmen into Kazakh 
land and that this would exacerbate tensions. Though he supported the principle of a border, 
his stated aim was a border which reflected the social realities of the area.lxxxv 
Iomudskii, as a member of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee, is likely to 
have espoused a particular conception of those social realities. Whereas Adai committees 
chose to emphasise the number of armed Iomuds on Kazakh land, reports originating from 
Krasnovodsk and its higher authorities tended to present the Kazakhs as perpetrators of 
violence.lxxxvi Already the vested interests of different national committees were pitting them 
against each other, meaning that border disputes were associated with national prestige and 
status rather than local questions of agricultural practice. Regardless, Iomudskii did not get 
his way. Documentation from the Central Asian Bureau in 1924 describes the formalized 
national borders of Soviet Central Asia, including the new Turkmen Republic which emerged 
out of western Turkestan. Certainly, the Bureau and others recognized the ethnic 
heterogeneity of the borderlands between the Kazakh Republic and its neighbours, remarking 
for example that many Kazakhs in or around the new Uzbek SSR were arable farmers, 
making them very difficult to distinguish from Uzbeks.lxxxvii The Krasnovodsk area is noted 
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for the predominance of only two major livelihoods: sedentary fishing and nomadic animal 
husbandry.lxxxviii But no extension of Turkmen jurisdiction into the Adai Uezd is recorded at 
this time.lxxxix 
It is difficult to say whether a border better placed, or a border less stringently 
observed, could have encouraged greater prosperity in the area, but the economy of the Adai 
Uezd remained one of the weakest in the Kazakh Republic for the rest of the decade. By the 
10th April 1929 it had been made into an okrug, a new Soviet economic region, and the 
Kazakh Central Executive Committee (KTsIK) and the Kazakh Soviet of People’s 
Commissars (Sovnarkom KASSR) presented VTsIK with a joint declaration ‘on the 
liquidation of the Adai Okrug of Kazakhstan’.xc In the two years since the process of 
raionirovanie turned the Adai Uezd into an okrug, the declaration claimed, the region had 
consistently underperformed economically.xci With only 177,000 registered residents, despite 
its considerable size, the Adai Okrug contained a disproportionately small amount of the 
republic’s population. Sixty-seven percent of its budget came from subsidies, and its entire 
budget (1,021,000 rubles for 1928-1929) was the equivalent of only 1.4 percent of the 
republic’s overall budget.  The principal economic activity of the okrug was still nomadic 
animal husbandry. Only 2 percent of the population was described as sedentary; 23 percent 
were semi-nomadic; 28 percent were nomadic with a migratory radius of up to 300 versts and 
47 percent were nomadic with a migratory radius of 1,000 versts or more. These nomadic 
communities reportedly remained impoverished and highly unstable. The trope of the 
wandering nomad at the mercy of the elements was as clear in this declaration as it was in 
Dzhangil′din’s 1923 report.xcii  KTsIK and Sovnarkom KASSR further admitted in 1929 that 
half of the region was always outside of the state’s control, wherever its administrative centre 
was located, because of the infrastructural inadequacies of the okrug.xciii 
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Back in 1922 the Kazakh and Turkmen communities of this region had shared a 
nomadic lifestyle. As even top agents of the Russian Communist Party became aware, a 
common preference for nomadism did nothing to ameliorate the often fierce rivalry between 
groups of Central Asians, but it did mean that such conflict differed in some respects from 
that witnessed in the north-west of the republic.xciv The two agricultural traditions competing 
over the outermost reaches of the Bukey Governate could not co-exist in the same space; a 
field cannot provide both crops and pasturage. The matter was simpler still because 
agricultural practice appeared to correlate more neatly with nationality. Disagreements arose 
over where to draw the line between nomadism and farming, Kazakhs and Cossacks, and in 
the deliberations on this question we see prevailing attitudes towards nomads emerge. In 
contrast, Turkmen and Kazakh nomads crossed paths repeatedly around the Garabogazköl 
Lagoon and on the Mangïshlak Peninsula. This made the establishment of two national 
jurisdictions considerably more difficult. But the Party’s use of national identity as a 
diagnostic tool to identify social ills had comparable effects in both cases. 
Like disputations taking place north of the Caspian, disagreements between Kazakh and 
Turkmen organs around the Garabogazköl were shaped by the emerging national 
administrative structures which sought to resolve them. It might first be assumed that these 
new structures would have benefitted nomadic populations. As with those in Urda, the notion 
of Kazakh national jurisdiction prompted Adai Uezd authorities to defend the interests of 
their residents even when they wandered beyond the borders of their republic. Yet the 
interests of the nation in fact acted as a doppelgänger to the interests of the nomad; they 
looked alike but were quite different and the prioritisation of national interests was a bad 
omen for nomadic communities. In the long term, from the later economic underperformance 
of the Adai region and the continuing expansion of arable farming east of Astrakhan it is 
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clear that the assertion and retention of Kazakh jurisdiction around the Caspian Sea did local 
nomads no special favours. 
Wider Implications 
Central Asian nomadism and Soviet border-making literally and theoretically 
intersected as frequently as might be expected. It is too simplistic to say that nomadism was 
incompatible with the division of land, but whereas a settled community might have a new 
dividing line imposed just metres from its outermost suburbs without trouble, a nomadic or 
transhumant community was likely to find that such a line deprives its people of essential 
resources. Similarly, it would be misleading to claim that nomads had no traditional 
understanding of land ownership or land rights, but it is true that their sense of ownership was 
more flexible and adaptable than the vulgarities of national delimitation might have 
allowed.xcv  
More significantly, Soviet border-making was a feature of the Bolsheviks’ predilection 
for categorising Central Asian peoples by national identity. This was not just novel for some 
of those they categorised; Adrienne Lynne Edgar says of the region: ‘It is hard to imagine a 
less congenial setting for the late-nineteenth century European doctrine of nationalism.’xcvi It 
distracted Party members from other systems of categorisation which were arguably more 
indicative of local social realities and were surely more congruent with the world view of 
their leaders. Though it built its political ideology from a materialist philosophy, it identified 
citizens by their notional economic function and claimed its legitimacy from its association 
with a particular class, the Communist Party disregarded the nomadic-sedentary division 
between peoples around the Caspian Sea - surely as material and economic a cleavage as it is 
possible to find - and strained to accommodate their national divisions instead.xcvii 
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The Caspian disputes of the early 1920s open new perspectives on both the National 
Question and nomadism in Soviet Central Asia. For the National Question, it uncovers a 
deficiency in the Bolsheviks’ initial approach to nationalities. This is measured not by the 
extent of its success in constructing or accurately representing nations. Instead, it is visible in 
the way the National Question frustrated the governance of nomadism, a social phenomenon 
which did not sit easily within new national boundaries, geographical or theoretical. A 
notionally emancipatory doctrine for formerly colonised non-European peoples actually 
expedited the ongoing decline of a Central Asian agricultural practice. This is easily 
overlooked in historical studies of the National Question precisely because nomadism was 
overlooked during the creation of national boundaries. On the matter of nomadism itself, the 
significance of the National Question’s influence should not be underestimated. It contributed 
to the maladministration of nomads which may eventually have led frustrated Party members 
to take drastic measures. We also begin to understand, on the other hand, what dictated 
relations between state and nomad before Collectivisation and Sedentarisation turned that 
relationship into a process of mass violence. 
A little later on in the decade, on 26th October 1924, the All-Union Central Executive 
Committee (VTsIK) would meet to discuss the next national territorial division of Central 
Asia. One attendee, Yannis Ruduztak, was an authority on the region among his colleagues in 
Moscow. Speaking of the various subgroups of Kazakh who populated the borderlands 
between modern day Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, he would complain that these groups’ 
cultural differences caused conflict in spite of the fact that they were all nomadic cattle 
herders, and therefore led very similar lives. The cultural distinctions between these Central 
Asians were politicising simple budgetary deliberations over whether or not to subsidise 
settled communities, he added.xcviii 
24 
 
Ruduztak may have had a point, but it is ironic that he should make it at a meeting 
convened to discuss the ongoing national delimitation of Central Asia. He held nomads 
themselves to blame for the political conflict which distracted administrators from the more 
fundamental economic questions of who was nomadic, who was sedentary, and who was in 
need of assistance. But the new Soviet state had been guilty of this misdirection, as Ruduztak 
would have it, from its very inception. 
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